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UTOPIAN PRAGMATISM: SCOTLAND’S CHOICE
Lindsay Paterson
Abstract
The Scottish referendum of autumn 2014 has been debated as if it was
a unique moment in the country’s history, and in several senses it was
indeed unprecedented – in the level of engagement by citizens which it
stimulated, in the acceptance by all sides to the debate that the decision on
independence was Scotland’s alone (which was an implicit recognition of
popular sovereignty), and in its being the ﬁrst ever democratic and explicit
endorsement of the Union by Scotland. Nevertheless, there is also a sense
in which the pattern of protest and compromise that led to the referendum
and that pervades its aftermath is very familiar – the latest in a series of such
processes that have characterised Scotland’s always evolving place in the
Union since 1707. Radical challenge is followed by pragmatic adjustment as
the state cedes just enough power to keep the Union intact for the time being,
a compromise which sows the seeds of the next phase of radical rebellion.
That is why Scotland’s position never fully satisﬁes anyone, and why, on
this occasion, the basis for a new challenge to the Union (and for a new
compromise to that new challenge) has probably already been laid before
even the outcome of this referendum has been fully settled.
Keywords: Referendum; independence; devolution; negotiated autonomy.
Introduction
Immediately after the Scottish independence referendum last autumn, it was
widely noticed that the losers were behaving as if they had won, getting on
with policy and preparing policy, while the winners, when not actually, with
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Labour, in a state of political trauma, were frantically active dealing with what
they think is the main issue, the constitution. Why? What has turned things
upside down, and no doubt will continue to do so long after the time of
writing of this article?
That such questions arise demonstrates one thing at least: the referendum
turns out to be more intriguing in its aftermath than the rather familiar
debates that led up to the vote. Scotland has been debating this question for
so long that no-one with any interest in politics, observing the very long
campaign leading to 18 September, can fail to have heard it all before – what
Tom Nairn called as long ago as 1970 ‘the tired legalistic arguments for
independence’, and ‘the totally Pickwickian “economic problem” of whether
Scotland would be “viable” and could survive “on her own” – as if she was
some kind of small shopkeeper, in fact, not part of an international economic
order’ (Nairn, 1970). The most visible public events of the campaign were
largely theatrical rather than of substance, and therefore inevitably focused
on personalities and performance – who would win the televised debates,
what would be the effect of interventions by Gordon Brown, David Cameron,
or George Osborne – or whether one or other of the prominent pro-
independence campaigners could cogently answer questions about currency,
tax or membership of the European Union. There was also a very extensive
debate taking place away from the television screens – online, and by more
traditional means – but all it had to go on was the same well-established
material that furnished the public debates, and so, to the extent that such
discussions can be observed at all, they do not seem to have yielded anything
strikingly new (Shephard et al., 2013, 2014).
None of that was surprising about the campaigning, since it was merely
bringing to a head various kinds of pressure that have been building in
Scotland for generations, perhaps for over century. The referendum appeared
to be, in Nairn’s words again, the moment when Scottish history at last
became real, ending what he thought was Scotland’s lamentable position
as ‘the land where ideal has never, even for an instant, coincided with fact.’
It was the moment, according to Jim Sillars, when, for the 15 hours of actual
voting, the Scottish people held sovereignty in their own hands (Sillars, 2014).
So the aftermath may seem utterly confusing. If Scotland was not
sovereign unless independent, then its capacity to set the agenda since it
voted has been quite remarkably autonomous. There is not only the manner
in which the various anti-independence parties, submitting proposals to
the Smith Commission on ‘strengthening the Scottish Parliament within
the UK,’ have in effect deﬁned these with reference to the option that is
explicitly ruled out – including or omitting speciﬁc powers according to
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whether they would strengthen or weaken the Union – but also the swift shift
to leadership of the maximal devolution campaign of the SNP and the Greens,
so apprehensive of that position as all the Unionist parties are. For a
party whose three-quarters-of-a-century-old policy had just been rejected by
the people on whose behalf it claims to speak more authentically than anyone
else, the SNP was in autumn 2014 in remarkably good fettle, aided (as were
the Greens) by an astonishing immediate rise in membership.
More fundamentally than in the minutiae of constitutional debate,
however, has been the speciﬁc policy responses, once again demonstrating
that the Scottish question has never really been directly about the
constitution. The difference from all previous setbacks for ardent home
rulers is that the losing party is still in power. Unlike after 1979 (when, as in
2014, Scotland was evenly divided) or 1992 (when the Tories were not wiped
out) – or unlike the party-political disappointment for the SNP of 1999 or
2003 – the party could respond by doing things. Thus we had John Swinney’s
budget, out-manoeuvring opponents by his headline-catching redistributive
use of minor taxation powers that were already coming Scotland’s way as the
long-term consequence of his party’s electoral victories in 2007 and 2011.
We had a change to the drink-drive limit, making use of new devolved powers
that had already arrived. We had the appearance of big bits of machinery
laying railway track to the borders, watched by transport minister Keith
Brown (while contending for the SNP deputy leadership). We had the rescue
of Ferguson shipbuilders in Port Glasgow, overseen by the First Minister
and aided by independence-supporting businessman Jim McColl, who also
prominently pressed ahead with innovative ideas about vocational education
in Glasgow. And we had, in response to UK government proposals, an
insistence from the Scottish Government that Scotland would remain fully
committed to the European Convention on Human Rights.
In contrast, as that last controversy illustrates, the UK government and the
British Labour Party have largely proceeded as if the referendum had never
happened, except when they remember about the constitutional question
explicitly, thus committing that old error of UK politicians of supposing
that the fuss really is, after all, about constitutions, the same myopia as – for
example – led Ian Lang two decades ago, when he was pre-devolution
Secretary of State for Scotland, to propose that the Scottish problem might be
dealt with by holding meetings of the Scottish Grand Committee in Scotland,
or led the normally sensible Michael Forsyth, when he inherited that blighted
ofﬁce, to imagine that carting the Stone of Destiny over the border bridge
between Cornhill and Coldstream would satisfy Scottish preferences for
national recognition. By and large, the season of UK party conferences in the
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autumn passed with a great deal of mutual congratulation, and a sigh of
relief that they still were of the UK. These unparalleled opportunities for
media exposure for a new unionism were dominated by debates about social
and economic policy which, as is customary, simply pretended that the UK is
a single entity, and paid no attention whatsoever to the kinds of social policy
that might be required to make a reality of such assumptions or of the lofty
rhetoric about unity rather than uniformity which these same UK leaders, only
weeks before, had proclaimed to be inviolable. The few unionist politicians
of UK stature who knew otherwise – pre-eminently Gordon Brown – were
notable by their absence. With the SNP government actually doing things
distinctively, this return to normality thus rendered these congratulations
decidedly premature and presumptuous, and sowed the seeds of electoral
retribution not far away in Scotland’s now permanent election campaign. No
wonder the Scottish Labour leader Johann Lamont resigned in frustration: her
(and Brown’s) position that the Union is quite consistent with growing Scottish
distinctiveness seemed incomprehensible to colleagues even within her own
party.
So what, from the perspective of much older history, are we to make of
this situation? Why did the independence campaign, though losing the vote,
attract to itself such radical commitment that it acquired the conﬁdence to
behave as if it had won? What are the consequences likely to be of the failure
of all but a handful of unionist politicians to see that the question is about
policy not structures? In trying to answer such questions, this article suggests
that the referendum and its aftermath are best seen as the latest instance in
a long-familiar process of always evolving Scottish autonomy. Radical activism
challenges existing structures of power, forcing them to compromise; but,
in compromising, the radicals’ programme is not satisﬁed, and so the seeds of
disillusion and then future dissent are sown at the very moment that current
discontent is appeased. If the current situation is another instance of that
process, it is also, however, new because of the unprecedented level of
political participation that the referendum provoked.
Pragmatism and utopianism: two stories about Scottish politics
There are two stories about Scotland in the Union, so different that they mark
a fundamental divide, and yet so dependent on each other that they render
that divide the most bitter of all. One is pragmatic. In the beginning, according
to this view, the Union was a wise bargain, struck by far-seeing politicians
aware of the immense dangers facing a small, poor and divided country on the
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edge of Europe. It was a treaty settled legally and, on the whole (by the
standards of the time) consensually and peacefully. It staved off immediate
invasion and a repeat of the enforced assimilation that, only half a century
earlier, Scotland had experienced under Cromwell. More positively, it gave
the very weak Scottish economy access to markets and – though this
was something that it took many decades to happen – the renewing
effects of vigorous economic competition. The Union also, according to
this view, created Scottish culture as we know it, precisely out of the tension
that then permanently ensued between local loyalty and wider – eventually
global – opportunity. Scotland’s still most important contribution to world
culture, the Enlightenment, is inconceivable without these dual pressures –
the universalism of the age, now penetrating into the heart of Scottish
thinking, and the continuing awareness of local loyalty, the attachment
to place and community and tradition. That is what makes Hume, Smith,
Ferguson, Hutcheson, Miller and Reid so different from the abstract theorising
of many other branches of the European Enlightenment, and so also similar
to contemporary English thinkers such as Samuel Johnson, for all the
differences of style.
The other story holds this pragmatism in contempt. The Union was a
betrayal, Scotland bought and sold by corrupt elites negotiating across a
border that the common people, allegedly, would never have voluntarily given
up. Whatever eventual beneﬁts the treaty brought, they took a long time
to come, and Scotland’s weak position permanently undermined its status. The
Enlightenment marked a cultural betrayal, not only in the essentially trivial
sense that most of the leading thinkers of the time went out of their way
to disown any sentimental attachments, but also in that their universalism
denied Scotland as a distinctive place. A state based on the universal principles
of liberty and the free market was thus a repudiation of anything which a
patriotic Scot would desire. Few would have accepted this critique at the
time, and those who did – such as most famously Burns, but also some of
the Enlightenment thinkers in their opposition to, for example, the refusal
to let Scotland raise its own militia – complained not so much that Scottish
autonomy was being eroded but that Scotland was not being treated equally;
thus the complaints were not about assimilation but about its absence.
But these discontents formed the basis of the recurrent protest from the mid-
nineteenth century onwards that the Union had never served Scotland well.
This duality is the reality of Scotland’s story – not the one or the other, but
both. Scotland has never been wholly content in the Union, because it has
rarely felt treated as an equal. Even agitating for equality can create a sense of
difference. But neither has Scotland ever shown any serious sign of wanting
Lindsay Paterson
26
to secede, until perhaps now, for the simple reason that the complaints
have always hitherto had their desired effect, or at least to the extent that
was needed to allay the discontent. Throughout the last three centuries, the
story has recurred: dissatisfaction grows, often to an intensity that threatens
to destroy the Union, at least among the politically active and vociferous.
The ground of that protest is always that Scots are not being treated
equally, with respect, with regard to their rights. But then the UK state
remembers its inherent ﬂexibility and pragmatism, and concedes just enough
not just to placate the discontent for the time being – which would be merely
cynical – but actually, wisely enough, appreciating what the real discontent is,
which is not about constitutional structures but about social, economic and
political issues.
There is probably nothing particularly unusual about this: the UK is not
as peculiar as a certain kind of sceptical history-writing, often of a Scottish
nationalist kind (such as by Tom Nairn himself), tends to suggest. Insofar
as democratic politics can ever inﬂuence social change, it probably does
so through a dialectic of this sort – radical pressure, slow establishment
response, compromise that leads to disillusion among the radicals, and then
in turn the next round of pressure. The Edinburgh sociologist Jonathan
Hearn puts this well, writing about much more general questions than those
faced by Scotland (but having taken account of the Scottish case):
in each case [of major social change] there is a movement of issues
onto the agenda, a politicisation of what was formerly normally taken
for granted. But this movement is triggered by troubles and conﬂicts
that develop around existing patterns of authority that are commonly
recognised as such.
(Hearn, 2012: 26)
It is this ‘common recognition’ that allows for periods of relative stability
(such as in Scotland for a decade after 1997, or as we are likely to be facing for
a while again now), but the scepticism that was generated by the previous
wave of protest never goes away. The key point, as Hearn notes (2012: 6),
is that disagreement over particular issues – say, how to fund a health service,
or how to expand higher education, or whether and how to redistribute
wealth – always leads in due course to questions about the very structures of
power through which issues might be resolved.
In short, protest and compromise and then later renewed protest against
the inevitably unsatisfactory eventual outcome of the previous compromise
has been the dynamic which has kept Scotland in the Union, though also
has always, for exactly the same reason, kept it permanently un-satisﬁed.
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What’s more, that seems likely now to be again what will result from
everything that has been happening these last few years. But before we get to
trying to understand what is likely to develop next, it is useful to look in some
more detail at previous episodes in this dynamic, partly to see how it has
worked, but mainly also to reﬂect on what is different this time.
The most recent previous phase started in the 1960s and led to the setting
up of the Scottish Parliament in 1997–9. During this period two now dominant
themes emerged. One is that Scotland is essentially to the left of England. The
other is that Scottishness and Britishness are at best complementary to each
other, and, more likely, antagonistic. These two fed off each other, Britishness
coming to be seen as itself a conservative identity, associated with a dead
empire and a decrepit ruling class. These themes started to emerge in the
1960s as voting patterns started to diverge, the Conservatives declining in
Scotland almost without interruption from one half to one quarter of the vote.
The protests against the lengthy period of Conservative government from
1979 to 1997 are then a familiar story, but it is the ideological character of
these which matter for interpreting their legacy. Not only did the campaigning
contrast radical Scotland with Tory England; it saw the problem as lying in the
unreformed constitutional structures of a Britain that was felt no longer to be
serving Scotland’s needs. The left-wing radicalism of the protests against the
Conservative government then became associated with radical ideas about
the constitution, asserting a putative Scottish tradition of popular sovereignty
to set against the centralising power of what was correspondingly perceived as
the dominant English tradition of monarchical power.
This was utopian campaigning of a peculiarly Scottish kind, since – with
supreme irony – only the outside intervention of Tony Blair managed to insist
that the popular sovereignty that was proclaimed would actually have to rest
on popular sovereignty, in a referendum that almost none of the campaigners
had advocated before he announced it as Labour policy in the summer of
1996. Popular sovereignty to that point had been the rhetoric of the Scottish
Constitutional Convention, an unelected and somewhat secretive mechanism
by which some segments of the public-sector middle class used its corporate
power in sundry civil-society organisations to induce the Labour party to
support reform. The story unfolded then as a series of compromises – the
inevitable acceptance that only a change of government at Westminster could
bring about a parliament, the inevitably constrained extent of its powers, and
thus the inevitable disappointment with its operation since it could never have
satisﬁed the astonishingly high levels of expectation that accompanied its
establishment: when voting in the referendum in 1997, enormous majorities
expected that a Scottish parliament would improve Scotland’s education,
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health service and economy, would empower citizens against Scottish
government, and would strengthen Scotland’s voice in the UK (Brown et al.,
1999). When none of these things seemed to have happened quickly,
disillusion began to fuel the next phase of radical protest that culminated in
due course in the referendum of 2014.
The key features of this period were then not only the emergence
of the rhetoric of Scotland as more left-wing than England, and Scotland
in fundamental antagonism to Britain, but – of much greater signiﬁcance
for interpreting how the protests were temporarily satisﬁed – the actual
capacity of the UK state to prove the inadequacy of both these utopian
propositions. The parliament was created by – to put it crudely – an English
Labour majority at Westminster, however important the sanction of the large
referendum majority in 1997 was. This was the result of non-Tory England
and the ﬂexibility of the UK state, recognising – belatedly perhaps – that
reform was required. Indeed, there is good reason to believe that it was
only because Blair could present the case as a reform of Britain, rather than
merely a response to radical Scottish campaigning, that the majority in the
1997 referendum was as large as it turned out to be (Brown et al., 1999).
So this whole period from the 1960s to the end of the century showed
the characteristic features of Scottish development quite graphically: utopian
articulation leading to radical protest, met eventually by a Britain grudgingly
remembering that its very essence has been a kind of muddled pragmatism,
but the compromises of which then store up the pressures that lead to the
next phase of protest, which is now.
The structural essence of the process was not new. When the campaigning
started in the 1960s, part of the nationalist protest recalled the early
commitment to Scottish home rule of the nascent Labour party up to the
1920s. When Labour was being radicalised on the home-rule question again
through the Constitutional Convention, its highly inﬂuential internal pressure
group, Scottish Labour Action, recalled these early days and complained
that, when Labour had had the chance to bring about home rule in the 1945
government, it had betrayed that legacy (McLean, 1991; see also Mitchell,
1996). Part of the radical protest from the left in the 1980s was based on a
sense that the old structures of the welfare state that had been set up by
that government were too centralised, patronising, and discouraging of
popular sovereignty. The Scottish radicalism of the 1920s and 1930s
had seemed to offer a quite different welfare state, or at least seemed
in retrospect half a century later to have done so. Scotland had taken from
the moral demise of nineteenth-century capitalism an attachment to the
state that was more intense than anything to be found in England.
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Scotland was the land of the Presbyterian common weal whose rhetoric of
millenarian emancipation pervaded Labour thinking. It was the place where
the democratic intellect would create an educated citizenry with the capacity
to challenge elites and seize popular control. It had inspired, according to this
story, radical Clydeside, in fond memory an almost revolutionary challenge to
capitalism. Furthermore, in disillusion with the slowly emerging caution of
Labour in the 1920s, this was also the period when the modern nationalist
movement was created.
The actual moderation of the 1945 government – and especially its
abandonment of any kind of Scottish legislative autonomy – looked to later
generations of radical campaigners to be unsatisfactory, but may be better
thought of as the then latest phase in the adjustment of the state to radical
Scottish challenge. The discontent with capitalism, and the sense of equal
citizenship that the 1939–45 war evoked, enabled these Scottish radicals to
ﬁnd allies throughout the UK, but the ends which they sought in common in
the short term – of using the state to mitigate the effects of capitalism – were
more important than the means of Scottish home rule, or the revolutionary
overthrow of the whole social order. In any case, revolution was coming to
have less of an appeal in the democratic world, faced with Russian realities
and with the duplicitous behaviour of the Communist Party in Britain in the
1930s, and so the prospect of setting up a pragmatically beneﬁcial welfare
state seemed the best compromise on offer. For Scottish socialists, moreover,
the opportunity to share risks across a democratising UK was very much more
appealing than trying to construct a welfare state on the increasingly insecure
basis of the declining Scottish economy. The land of the democratic intellect
could smoothly adapt to middle opinion as an alliance of technocrats and
socialists; the pioneering of a public medical service in the Highlands in
the 1930s could ﬁt well with the new NHS; the place where regional economic
planning was invented (at Glasgow University) could readily accept that a
welfare state needed to be centralised. These late-1940s compromises
contained the seeds of the post-1960s radical challenges, just as the 1990s
devolution settlement led, two decades later, to the radical campaigning
for independence, but in each case the translation of prior radicalism into
pragmatic adjustment was an instance of a recurrent theme.
Analogous stories can take us right back to the Union. One further instance
is the response of Scottish Victorian liberalism to the growing power of
the central state after the middle of the nineteenth century. The essentially
anti-statist Calvinism that was the source of the dominant Scottish liberal
philosophy had been expressed locally, but local forums were ceding power
to the central state which was perceived to be dominated by alien Tory
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paternalism. Out of this sense of looming powerlessness and marginalisation
came what is recognisable as the ﬁrst stirrings of modern nationalism, notably
in the National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights in the 1850s.
The outcome of this liberal campaigning, by the 1880s, was – as later – a
series of compromises. The state responded by setting up the Scottish
Ofﬁce – without which there would not have been, much later, the Scottish
aspects of the welfare state or the machinery of government that eventually
became the executive of the Scottish Government – but at the time it
mattered rather in a symbolic sense as a recognition of Scottish rights.
More profoundly, what actually left a direct legacy in the capacity of Scottish
civil society to manage the transition from unregulated capitalism was
the development of new ways of retaining in Scottish local hands the
developing liberal-welfare state – school boards, incipient medical services,
the beginnings of public support for the poor, all staffed by the growing
armies of professionals who had imbibed the ethos of Calvinist responsibility
in their studies at universities. Moreover, as with the socialists who saw
the Union as a way of spreading economic risk after 1945, these people
remained attached to the Union above all because it seemed to guarantee
international security and access to imperial markets: the dangers of smallness
and peripherality were themes long before the debates in the 2014
referendum. It was then this network of liberal boards and committees
which became the undemocratic institutions against which socialists (and,
later, nationalists) protested in the 1920s, with the resulting compromise of
1945.
Such processes of challenge and compromise throughout the last three
centuries then may be interpreted in the two ways which we have noted,
shaping the debate which we now have. On the one hand is the claim that
Scotland has always recognised sovereignty as limited, ﬂuid, and negotiated.
That theme was asserted in the 1980s often against the centralising
tendencies of the Conservative government – Margaret Thatcher’s sense
that an absolute majority in parliament gave her the absolute right to
implement the policies of the ruling party. This was the whole tenor of the
Claim of Right which the Scottish Constitutional Convention issued in 1988.
That was part of the immediate political context, as was the feminist view
that absolute notions of power were inconsistent with a democracy which
enabled participation. Lying further in the background of the notion of limited
sovereignty were the Calvinist and Catholic views that to claim absolute
secular power is hubristic, because no human institutions can be omniscient.
The most important shift in SNP thinking in the 1980s – from independence to
independence in Europe – recognised the artiﬁciality of absolute sovereignty,
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too, and accepted that sharing risk across large territories is pragmatically
sensible. The very concept of independence might then seem chimerical, and
thus point to a No vote in 2014, though many of the individual activists
who argued against UK state sovereignty in the 1980s and 1990s were to
be found arguing for a Scottish version of it in 2014, sometimes forced there
by the artiﬁcially dichotomous choice that had been imposed in the
referendum.
The other interpretation – much more publicly to the fore in 2014 – was
that the ﬁrst view is craven. If the artiﬁcially simple choice between
independence and roughly the current structure of power appealed to a
certain kind of unionist, it certainly also suited the mirror-image nationalist for
whom only sovereign independence could ever be truly autonomous. Though
Tom Nairn, as we saw, used to be sceptical of that position, he had, by the
mid-1990s, come to a view that was close to it, and which has in turn inspired
the current generation of radical activists. What he has referred to as merely
‘managerial’ autonomy involved opting out of history, leaving real politics to
elsewhere. He calls this a preference for ‘lower case’ rather than ‘upper case’
nationalism. Managerial autonomy, he claimed, is debilitating culturally and
psychologically, inducing what he calls ‘display identity’ – notoriously, he
believes, the empty rhetoric of Labour politicians apparently asserting the
rights of an entity they call ‘the Scottish people,’ but not following that
through into a determined assertion of national autonomy. Nationalist
agitation in Scotland, according to Nairn, and echoed frequently in the 2014
debate, is a popular attempt to re-enter the mainstream, both politically and
culturally. What Nairn called in his 1970 essay the redemptive dream of
separatist nationalism – recognising in the description its utopian character –
had come by 2014 to be the driving force of the campaigning for
independence.
The main point, to reiterate, is not whether one or other of these two
stories is the more accurate account, but that they are dependent on each
other: political pressure forces change – because without pressure Scotland is
ignored, regarded with incomprehension by the state – but the change is a
compromise, and so the next wave of disillusion and then utopian frustration
is built into the pragmatic response. This operates on both the major
ideological dimensions which affected the 2014 debates. Social democrats
need radical socialists. Home rulers need radical nationalists. But neither the
socialists nor the nationalists will ever get what they want because what they
want is utopian, and – more to the point – the Scots will always be content to
accept that for a while, until the next wave of frustration and protest comes
along.
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The two stories in the referendum
The referendum debate is, then, best understood as the latest confrontational
playing out of these two stories about Scotland’s history, developing
most immediately from the period between 1997 and 2011: it is the
eventual revolt of the utopian left against what is perceived as the insufferable
caution and conservatism of Scottish civil society. Before the advent of the
parliament, there remained a question about its relationship to the already
heavily populated institutional landscape, large segments of which – through
the Constitutional Convention – had agitated for its existence. Would the
parliament challenge these vested interests, or be captured by them?
The answer was always in fact obvious. Partly because of its parentage in the
Convention, partly because of its limited economic powers, partly because
of the negotiations and compromises that the parliament’s consultative style
enjoined, and partly because there was never a practicable programme
of radical social policy on offer (though plenty of improbable rhetoric), the
Parliament could never have avoided becoming civil society incarnate. It
was completely dependent on civic elites for ideas, too, since the Scottish
civil service lacked experience and expertise in all but a few areas of policy:
recurrently, this and the incessant consultations, led to experts in various
interest groups being consulted on proposals which they themselves had been
centrally involved in drafting. None of this diminished when the SNP came to
power in 2007, or even when it had an absolute majority in 2011, because it,
too, was dependent on civil society for ideas, and also had learnt from the
experience of the Constitutional Convention that change would come only if
civil society was on its side.
This all gave a ready target for the radical independence campaign, although
its gravest weakness was – like the anti-globalisation ‘Occupy’ movement in
2011, which it quite closely resembled – not to have produced an alternative,
worked-out programme. Never before had the early Nairn’s characterisation of
modern Scottish nationalism as redemption seemed so apt, so closely tied had
the campaign come to a metaphor of national liberation. To say this during the
campaign was to attract accusations of negativity, of pessimism, of precisely
the dependency that the later Nairn alleged. Yet to raise such points was to do
no more than generations of pragmatists had done before in response to
generations of utopians. The belief that independence would lead to radical
social change was the campaign’s dominant theme. The Scottish Government’s
manifesto for independence, Scotland’s Future, believed that ‘independence
means that the people of Scotland will take responsibility for our future
into their own hands,’ with no hint of the prior 1990s Scottish debates about
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inter-dependence and the constraints on autonomy. Nor was there any
admission of the compromises entailed in real social progress, or of the
internal ideological divisions that all societies have:
if we transfer decision-making powers from Westminster to Scotland
we are more likely to see policies that are in tune with the values of
the people of Scotland, that close the gap between rich and poor, and
provide greater opportunities for everyone in Scotland regardless of
their background. We can build a fairer society.
The utopian theme was echoed before the actual vote by almost all
the most eloquent exponents of independence. Thus Joyce McMillan wrote
in July 2014 of ‘the positive forces that have been unleashed in Scotland by
this campaign, of their irreverence, their conﬁdence, their inventiveness,
and their determination – whatever the referendum outcome – to work at
grass-roots level to unleash more of this county’s magniﬁcent potential,’
and she saw as the enemy of this uprising not only ‘Westminster’ but also,
internally, ‘Scotland’s traditional power-holders, from the landowners and
big commercial interests to the mainstream politicians, local councillors and
senior public servants.’ Accurately noting that ‘for Scotland, the Union has
always been conditional on its ability to deliver real gains, in terms of
freedom, opportunity and justice,’ she implicitly assumed that the Union could
no longer do so, engulfed as it was, she said, by ‘the huge right-ward shift of
Westminster politics over the past generation.’
As prominent in putting this case as McMillan was Lesley Riddoch, writing
in August 2014 that ‘the social democratic leaning of Scottish voters is almost
as old as women’s right to vote,’ in other words since the 1920s. She
contrasted ‘Scotland’s traditions of education, law and religion’ with ‘England’s
increasingly market-obsessed, winner-takes-all society . . . – a culture of
uninhibited greed created by Margaret Thatcher and fuelled by New
Labour’s failure to reform or regulate.’ This national difference, she said,
was ‘the main driver for Scottish independence.’
Further back, in a collection published in 2012 on the question of
independence (nearly all in fact pro-independence), there were several
contributions in this vein. Alan Armstrong, veteran socialist activist, argued,
echoing struggles long ago, that ‘socialists should use the referendum
campaign not only to put forward a very different vision of an independent
Scotland, but to link this up with all those resisting the current attacks on our
class’ (Armstrong, 2012). Alan Bissett proposed that ‘the ﬁrst thing we must do
is re-admit the concept of a working class back into politics. This class not only
never went away, given how many were left behind by both Thatcher and
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Blair, but is now expanding to include “middle-class” people whose living
standards have narrowed’ (Bissett, 2012). The socialist case was probably most
visibly expressed by Jim Sillars, who wrote in spring 2014 that ‘the myth of
Scottish inadequacy’ would be dispelled ‘when, on achieving independence,
Scots own their own country, are beholden to no one, bend the knee to no
one, ask permission of no one for policies the people need, when they can
think new thoughts, embrace new ideas and use the power that lies latent
within themselves to change things for the better forever. In place of fear we
will create a nation proud, self-conﬁdent, prosperous, in which the working
people will have the opportunity to exert their power to quickly build a fair
and just society.’As with Armstrong, there is an unacknowledged slippage from
‘Scotland’ to speciﬁc social classes within Scotland, a synecdoche that has
characterised rhetoric about Scotland since the 1920s. No wonder there was a
van touring Edinburgh on polling day proclaiming that voting Yes would ‘end
Tory rule forever;’ the surprise is indeed that even as many as 8% of the
people who voted Conservative in the 2011 Scottish parliamentary election
voted Yes (YouGov, 2014).
The ultimate effect of such axiomatic rhetorical assertions of Westminster’s
collusion in worsening social conditions was graphically exempliﬁed during
the ﬁnal BBC referendum debate, held in Stirling on 14 September (BBC
Scotland, 2014), when a questioner’s personal experience of witnessing
child poverty in Lanarkshire ‘through the Thatcher and Labour years’ was
confronted by Labour MP Douglas Alexander’s reciting the statistical evidence
on its reduction when Labour was in power (Joyce and Sibieta, 2013; Sinclair
and McKendrick, 2014). There was a sense of two kinds of politics – the
utopian and the pragmatic – in mutual incomprehension, as if, faced with the
aspiration to end poverty altogether, any measurable progress towards it was
a mere ﬁgment.
Yet, implausible thought this rhetoric of radical Scotland against
conservative Westminster may seem, to point that out is to mistake its
function (as distinct from its conscious purpose). The utopianism is precisely
what Scottish frustration with compromise provokes, and it was entirely
to be expected during this campaign in particular, as was the initial negativity
of the other side and the eventual forced compromise offering of more
powers. Almost no-one on the No side acknowledged during the campaign
the appeal to many of voting Yes, far less that the proposition was not
absurd, however undesirable it might be in their judgement. With the
notable exception of Gordon Brown, there were no extended expositions of
the case against independence, which in one sense was also to be expected:
as another audience member in that BBC Stirling debate noted, the answer to
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the question of what would happen in the event of No majority is
the condition that Scotland was then in (about which he was not
enthusiastic). The Yes campaign had to set up a dystopia of No as the basis
of its own utopian imaginings, but, under a Conservative-led government
which, in a partisan sense, appealed to almost no likely Yes voters, that
demonising task was readily done. The No campaign’s negativity helped Yes
along this way.
Yet there was also something deeply disingenuous about the Yes campaign
complaint that the No side was negative, since the essence of the bargain
between autonomy and inter-dependence that has commanded Scottish
assent for three centuries is that the world is a risky place. If a philosophy was
needed for that during the referendum campaigning, it was found in the
speeches and writing of Gordon Brown, alone among politicians in developing
a sustained intellectual defence of the Union. The essence of his case was the
source of compromise that has recurrently reconciled Scotland to the Union,
the sharing of risks:
behind the pooling and sharing of risks and resources . . . is more
than mutual interests – also a shared commitment to values that
emphasise the importance of fairness, creating a Britain based on
social justice between the nations and allowing us to deﬁne our
country as a moral community.
(Brown, 2014: 232)
This, he said, was the ultimate contribution made by the Scottish
Enlightenment, the sense of ‘mutual human obligation.’ The welfare state
and similar achievements of the social democratic Union ‘would make Adam
Smith and David Hume immensely proud.’
We are reminded here of a generous obituary assessment of John Smith,
Labour Leader, by his friend (and nationalist politician) Neil MacCormick:
like many social democrats faithful to some version of the ideal
of international socialism and brotherhood, he was impatient of
diversions from what he saw as the prime objective of pursuing social
justice on as broad a front as possible. Social justice was to be secured
only through the election of a Labour government. Paying people their
pay ‘in a tartan pay packet’ would enhance neither income nor
job security, as he once trenchantly put it in a [Glasgow University]
Union debate. He saw no contradiction between his full-hearted
commitment to a consciously British (and largely fabian) political
tradition while at the same time profoundly attached to the mixed
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Gaelic-Scots heritage of Mid-Argyll and Kintyre where he and his
people had their roots.
(MacCormick, 1994)
We are reminded, too, of one of the few publicly amicable exchanges in this
recent campaign, between Andrew Wilson, former SNP MSP, and Alex Massie,
No-supporting journalist (Massie and Wilson, 2014). Massie, who is not a
socialist, it should be said, could characterise the Union in ways that would
have been recognised by Brown, and might also be traced to Smith and Hume:
Alex Salmond says Scotland is a ‘surly lodger’ in the United Kingdom
but that’s not true is it? The United Kingdom is our house too, not a
place in which we pay rent. We built it. Indeed, without Scotland there
is no Great Britain. . . . The UK is our country too.
Fiscal responsibility, he agreed, was indispensable: ‘you are right that a
parliament with the power to spend but no responsibility to tax is a juvenile,
half-formed legislature. Moreover it is one that will be persuaded that
more money is the only answer to every problem. It guarantees spendthrift,
unimaginative government.’ Wilson, responding to this recognition of the
respectable case for a great deal of independence, even if not actual
statehood, could say that ‘my appeal to you is not out of a disrespect for
the story of the UK or Britain. That was a joint project that delivered much
for many. But I feel it has run its course.’
Such writers, it might be imagined, could readily assent to Brown’s
argument that the principles underpinning the Union were not
fundamentally distinct from those characterised as Scottish by the most
ardent Yes campaigners. Brown in effect claimed for the Union the pragmatic
compromises that have been the response to radical campaigning, and
identiﬁed the shared principles that might explain why the compromises
have worked in the past. The persistent such principle has been a commitment
to universalism. The claim by the Yes side that exercising caution was craven,
or that urging people to do so was inappropriate, seems bizarre when they
could also argue (in Scotland’s Future, for example) that a No vote would
lead to all sorts of things of which the prominent supporters of the Yes
campaign disapprove – ‘a new generation of nuclear weapons on the Clyde’,
‘decisions with damaging effects on Scottish society’, ‘overall levels of public
spending in Scotland . . . driven by decisions on priorities for England’, funding
cuts that would have ‘serious consequences for Scottish public services’,
and ‘the serious possibility that Scotland will be forced to leave the EU against
the wishes of the people of Scotland.’ The validity of these claims may be
Utopian Pragmatism
37
contested, as may the descriptions of England by Yes campaigners which we
noted above; but what is indisputable is that they are every bit as negative in
their characterisation of the consequences of a No vote as were the No side’s
claims about independence. Politics always contains negatives as well as
positives; utopia always depends on a dystopia to give it force.
The two stories in the outcome
What we have then now is all too familiar, a radical assertion followed by a
compromise that was forced from the state in order to stem the appeal of that
rebellion. But in another sense the situation we are now in is unprecedented
because, for the ﬁrst time, there has been an explicit, democratic vote on
the ultimate utopia of national freedom. The implications for independence
of each previous referendum could be endlessly debated because it was never
offered. The implications for or against independence of votes for or against
the SNP were, likewise, always unclear, because people vote for parties on
many grounds (for Labour at Westminster elections perhaps because the
SNP cannot form a government there; now for the SNP at Scottish elections
because on the whole they are seen to be efﬁcient and competent at doing
the mundane business of governing). The original Union, no matter how
constitutionally valid in its time, was in no modern sense democratic.
The difference now comes from three separate features of the 2014
vote. First, there was agreement by almost everyone that the decision was
Scotland’s alone. That was a decision to recognise that sovereignty does lie
with the people of Scotland, and the contingent outcome of the actual
vote does not change that: the proposition was not ‘is Scotland a sovereign
nation?’, since no one seemed to doubt that it was. The claim that sovereignty
was surrendered by there having been a No majority is unsustainable. The only
issue at stake was whether popular sovereignty required sovereign
institutions.
The second novel situation is the very extensive engagement with the
process of the debate, and the largest electoral participation since the coming
of full adult suffrage. As the journalist Peter Jones observed:
behind all that participation was passionate debate and exuberant
organisation. Groups backing No and Yes sprang up all over the place,
some marshalled by common interests and occupation, many more
drawn together by ties of community. Experienced politicians were
surprised by the astounding vitality that the indyref unleashed.
(Jones, 2014)
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It is not now plausible to argue that the nation has not decided, except on
the grounds satirised poetically by Brecht in the aftermath of the violent
suppression of the rising in Berlin in 1953:
After the uprising of the 17th of June
The Secretary of the Writers Union
Had leaﬂets distributed in the Stalinallee
Stating that the people
Had forfeited the conﬁdence of the government
And could win it back only
By redoubled efforts. Would it not be easier
In that case for the government
To dissolve the people
And elect another?
Nevertheless, lacking in a sense of historical irony though blaming the
people may be, some Yes campaigners were not slow in doing so: ‘Scotland,
the country that wasn’t’ proclaimed the web site Wings Over Scotland the day
after the referendum, ‘it pains us to say, will get the reward it deserves for its
gutlessness’ (Campbell, 2014). Joyce McMillan argued that ‘the country’ had
been ‘shot ﬁrmly in the foot with our own hands, and back on our knees, the
position in which we seem to feel most comfortable,’ not a view presumably
shared by the 55% of the country who voted No (McMillan, 2014b).
The third new aspect of the situation is that the compromises seem to
have been built into the process, in the sense that the leaders of the UK-wide
parties made speciﬁc and veriﬁable commitments to strengthen the powers
of the Scottish parliament before the referendum took place. A referendum
tends to focus the mind in that way, unlike the more diffuse processes of
pressure and adjustment represented by, say, the uncertain rise of the Labour
party between the 1920s and 1945, but the commitment compared to the
previous referendum that was almost evenly divided (in 1979) is striking.
Moreover, if the analysis put forward here is valid, then the fact that the
compromise became in effect part of the vote means that the next phase of
utopian dissatisfaction with the compromise will also probably be accelerated.
The task facing the state has been made all the more intractable by the
dichotomous choice which it forced on the referendum. Faced with a yes vote
as high as 45%, those unionist politicians must be rediscovering a strand of
Britishness that they seem to have forgotten – the virtue of compromise: well
gone are the days when they used to claim (Guardian, 2014) that they had to
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win ‘emphatically’ in order to ‘kill off independence’; they are now relieved to
have won not too narrowly. Indeed, the most compromising party of all here
bears the main responsibility. If the Liberal Democrats had been far-sighted
enough in 2007, they might have entered into a coalition with the SNP on
condition that a referendum offered multiple choices (as in the two-question
referendum of 1997). A clear rejection of independence, and a clear way
ahead, may well then by now have been the outcome. They and other
unionists of similar belligerence are learning too late the wisdom of Colin
Kidd’s comment that ‘it is a category error . . . to think of unionism and
nationalism as opposites’ (Kidd, 2008: 6).
As it is, we have, from the losing side, an aftermath replete with those very
myths of rebellion and betrayal that, recurrently in the past, have fed the
Scottish predilection for renewed utopian intransigence and thus, in this case,
for a fresh referendum not very far away. A myth immediately grew up that,
in McMillan’s words again, ‘the union was only saved . . . by the overwhelming
No vote of pensioners who can remember the UK in better times. And the
vote also represented a victory of the comfortable over the dispossessed,
of traditional top-down politics over a new grassroots politics, and of the
relatively silent and disengaged over the engaged, the active and the
passionate.’ One aspect of that interpretation was immediately discredited,
the widely cited poll by Lord Ashcroft that supposedly showed 71% of
16–17-year-olds voting Yes, and yet had a mere 14 people in that age group
(Ashcroft, 2014): more reliable data from YouGov showed the 16–24 age
group to be evenly split, the highest Yes vote to be in ages 25–39 (55%), and
people aged 65 or older in fact to have a sizeable minority (34%) voting Yes
(YouGov, 2014). (Nevertheless, that Keith Brown, contending to be elected as
SNP deputy leader, was still repeating the 71% ﬁgure a month later (Brown,
2014) suggests that the myth would be stubborn.) But the view that the
Yes vote was a revolt by the dispossessed against the well-off has gained
much momentum. Cat Boyd, of the Radical Independence Campaign, wrote
that ‘as the vote got closer we saw a surge in support for independence
among working class people who saw a Yes vote as a chance for change’
(Boyd, 2014). Pat Kane believed that ‘among the more afﬂuent and settled in
our society, the basic conﬁdence that Scotland had the resources and
competence to make its way as an economically independent nation, even
under adverse opinion and conditions, crumbled away at the last’ (Kane,
2014).
Almost certainly the reality is much more complex, although we will have
to await data from the various post-referendum academic surveys before
we can be sure. What we do know, from data from the Scottish Social
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Attitudes Survey collected in mid-summer 2014 (and thus at a time when the
Yes percentage among those who had made up their minds was still around
40%) was that the Yes support was not straightforwardly about social class but
was rather about an interaction of political ideology and class. The message
from the Table below is essentially that the Yes movement was led by left-
leaning middle-class people. The Yes percentage in the left-leaning middle
class among those who had made up their minds was 47%, higher than the
42% in the working class as a whole (and much the same as the 51% in the
left-leaning working class). The roughly half (47%) of working-class people who
leant to the right ideologically had only 33% support for Yes. The left-leaning
middle class was already far ahead of the working class in 2013: in the Scottish
Social Attitudes Survey of that year, their Yes percentage was already 48%,
when the working class as a whole had 36%.
Even more speciﬁcally, the Yes vote was a left-wing male vote: in 2014, 58%
of left-wing men intended to vote Yes, compared to 40% of left-wing women.
Among left-wing working-class men (see Table), this reached 62%, whereas
there was no class division among left-wing women. So what we have here is
a familiar case of a movement led by male, left-wing, middle-class activists,
speaking certainly to male, left-wing, working-class people, but less
convincingly to the working class or women in general.
The middle-class left-wing leadership of the Yes campaign helps to explain
the rhetoric both before and after the vote, but another myth which also has
grown – that the vote was not about nationalism – also turns out probably
not to be the case. The radical activist Cat Boyd has claimed that ‘it was not
a wave of Scottish nationalism that powered the momentum towards a
Yes vote: this was a debate about social justice, economic democracy and an
opportunity for radical change.’ We have directly relevant data on this only
from 2013, but from that year’s Scottish Social Attitudes Survey we can classify
people according to whether they felt they had more in common with a ‘same
class English person’ or an ‘opposite class Scottish person’, or that it depended
on the person. About 37–38% of both the middle class and the working class
felt they had more in common with someone who was an opposite class Scot;
the remaining 62% were split evenly between the other two options. The
Yes percentage was highest among those of either class who identiﬁed most
with ‘opposite class Scots’: 46% and 41% respectively among such working-
class and middle-class people, compared to 36% and 31% in the working class
and middle class overall. Again, the percentages were highest among left-wing
groups who identiﬁed with opposite-class Scots, notably in the middle class:
53% in the working class, and 59% in the middle class. Thus not only may we
conclude that the Yes intention was strong among left-leaning middle-class
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people; it was strongest among those left-leaning middle-class people who
identiﬁed with working-class Scots, and among left-leaning working-class
people who did not show much solidarity with working-class people across the
border. These ﬁndings are consistent with much other research suggesting that
Table
Support for Yes, by social class, ideology and gender, 2014
(excluding people who had not decided)
Working class Middle class
Left 51 [190] 47 [251]
Right 33 [172] 19 [302]
All 42 [362] 32 [553]
Male
Left 62 [96] 53 [128]
Right 35 [82] 21 [128]
All 48 [178] 37 [256]
Female
Left 39 [94] 40 [123]
Right 31 [90] 17 [174]
All 35 [184] 27 [297]
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2014.
The responses show people choosing Yes among people who had a deﬁnite view; thus
the No percentages are 100 minus those shown. Percentages are weighted.
Unweighted sample sizes are shown in brackets
Deﬁnitions:
From National Statistics Socio-Economic Classiﬁcation:
Working class: lower supervisory, technical, semi-routine, routine.
Middle class: employers, managers, intermediate, self-employed.
Left and Right are derived as respectively below and above the median on a scale
constructed as the sum of responses (each on a ﬁve-point scale from ‘strongly agree’ to
‘strongly disagree’) to questions asking about (a) whether ‘government should
redistribute income from the better off to the less well off’; (b) whether there is ‘one
law for the rich and one for the poor’; (c) whether ‘ordinary people do not get their fair
share of the nation’s wealth’; (d) whether ‘big business beneﬁts owners at the expense
of workers’; (e) whether ‘management will always try to get the better of employees if
it gets the chance’.
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choosing Yes or No was strongly associated with how Scottish or British people
felt (Curtice, 2014; McCrone, 2013).
In short, this was not straightforwardly a radical assertion of working-class
socialism against elites. It was a rebellion by a minority of people on the left
in both middle-class and working-class social groups. That is an important
social feature of the Yes vote, but it does not make it a mass revolt against
globalisation. The inclination to vote Yes is better understood as, on the whole,
an expression of pragmatic nationalist discontent, something which Scotland
has seen many times before. It was socially reformist in a mild way, in the
sense that it was not very friendly to the Conservatives, but it was as much
about national assertion as about ideology. It was about constitutions only as
constitutions ever have been contemplated in Scotland, as means to certain
social policy ends. Perhaps it was Gordon Brown’s realism that won it for
the No side, but even that had an element of utopianism, and he uniquely
had the insight to see that he had to appeal to gut-instinct national identity
and patriotism: his ﬁnal speeches read like the moderate left-wing home-
rule discourse of a previous era, though – as always with him – much more
redolently of the moral passion of the Covenanters. It remains to be seen
whether the promises will be delivered and, if they are (which seems likely, if
only on the grounds of Labour self-interest) whether they satisfy campaigners
on either side. The precedents for how Scotland reacts to past compromises
do not hold out much hope for this one, and the energy of the ex-Yes
campaign since the referendum suggests that Bernard Levin’s explanation
of utopian optimism remains cogent as a description of Scottish responses
to its parliament: ‘utopians are inured to disappointment [because] there
are always fellow-utopians to throw a life-belt to those struggling in the water
of broken promise’ (Levin, 1994: 123).
That pragmatic adjustment to circumstances is the way things happen in
the UK. That’s also why the utopian movement that the Yes campaign has
set in motion will remain deeply relevant even to the extent – or especially
to the extent – that it is wrong. It was their campaigning that forced the
compromises from the state that settled the issue. It was their assertion
that to be Scottish is to be left-wing that galvanised a campaign which
could probably never have been led by the SNP alone, and it was their
radicalism that has kept the SNP marginally on the left, to Labour’s discomfort.
It was also their radicalism that forced the intervention from Brown,
countering them on their own ideological ground with just sufﬁcient cogency
to win this particular day. The compromise that will be put in place in the next
few years will work for a while, but already has before it, in this radicalism,
its own nemesis. So the whole question will come back, perhaps with greater
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acceleration if pushed on its way by external circumstances, such as a
disputed result in the likely EU referendum. But, whatever happens, the
outcome will continue to be compromise, will continue to generate radical
discontent, and thus will never settle the Scottish question to the satisfaction
of anyone.
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